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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant Pedro Ramon Payano appeals his sentence on 
the ground that the District Court’s mistaken belief as to the 
applicable statutory maximum constitutes plain error.  In his 
view, this error warrants resentencing by way of analogy to 
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Molina-Martinez v. United States where the Supreme Court 
held that an incorrectly calculated United States Sentencing 
Guidelines range presumptively satisfies the prejudice prong 
of plain-error review because of its “centrality” to a district 
court’s sentence.  136 S. Ct. 1338, 1346 (2016).  We agree that 
there was error but decline to extend the presumption of 
prejudice recognized in Molina-Martinez to this context 
because a mistaken understanding about the applicable 
statutory range, without more, has far less bearing on the actual 
sentence imposed than a Guidelines-calculation error.  
However, because we conclude on this record that the error did 
affect Payano’s substantial rights and without correction would 
seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings, we will vacate his sentence and remand 
for resentencing.   
 
I. Background 
 
 Payano is a citizen of the Dominican Republic who first 
came to the United States legally with his parents at age twelve.  
In 1998, at age eighteen, he pleaded guilty to first degree 
possession of a controlled substance in New York state court, 
and in 2001, after completing his sentence of three years to life 
imprisonment, he was removed based on that drug possession 
conviction.  Although Payano illegally reentered the United 
States in 2012, his presence was not discovered until 2017 
when a Pennsylvania state trooper pulled over his vehicle.  
After an extended traffic stop, the trooper obtained consent to 
search the vehicle and found a kilogram of cocaine hidden in 
an interior panel. 
 
 A grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
indicted Payano for illegal reentry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 
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§ 1326, and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or 
more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 
(b)(1)(B)(II).  On Payano’s pretrial motion to suppress, the 
District Court agreed with him that the drugs found in the 
vehicle were fruit of an unconstitutional search because the 
trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop.  The 
Government then dismissed the drug charge, and Payano 
pleaded guilty to illegal reentry.  Because Payano’s 1998 
conviction was for drug possession and not drug distribution, 
it qualified under federal law as a felony, but not an aggravated 
felony, for purposes of the illegal reentry offense.  
Accordingly, Payano’s plea was to a violation of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1326(b)(1), which applies to illegal reentry following a 
“felony (other than an aggravated felony)” and carries a 
maximum sentence of ten years, and not 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), 
which applies to illegal reentry following an “aggravated 
felony” and carries a maximum sentence of twenty years. 
 
 In anticipation of sentencing, the United States 
Probation Office prepared a Presentence Report (PSR).  That 
report correctly calculated the applicable Guidelines range as 
24-30 months’ imprisonment and correctly listed the statutory 
maximum term of imprisonment as ten years.  However, 
instead of citing § 1326(b)(1) as the offense of conviction, it 
cited § 1326(b)(2).  Although the PSR made no reference to 
illegal reentry following an aggravated felony nor made 
mention of § 1326(b)(2)’s twenty-year maximum, the citation 
error was compounded when the Government argued in its 
sentencing memorandum seeking an upward variance that 
Payano had been “convicted of an aggravated felony prior to 
his deportation,” JA 69 n.2, and when it requested at the 
sentencing hearing that the District Court “correct” the PSR to 
reflect that Payano had pleaded guilty to “aggravated reentry,” 
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carrying a twenty-year statutory maximum sentence.  JA 92-
93.  The District Court ordered that the PSR be amended to 
reflect that change—a “correction” to which Payano’s counsel 
agreed.  JA 92.  Neither the District Court nor the parties 
mentioned it again during the proceedings, but at the 
conclusion of the hearing, the District Court granted the 
Government’s motion for an upward variance. It then imposed 
a four-year sentence, 18 months above the Guidelines range, 
yet well below the applicable ten-year statutory maximum and, 
a fortiori, well below the twenty-year maximum that the 
District Court believed applicable. 
 
II. Discussion1 
 
 Payano argues, for the first time on appeal, that he is 
entitled to resentencing because the District Court plainly erred 
by accepting that the applicable statutory maximum was 
twenty, as opposed to ten, years’ imprisonment.2  As the 
Government conceded at oral argument that our review is for 
plain error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b),3 
                                                          
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). 
 
 2 Because we will vacate Payano’s sentence, we need 
not address his two additional arguments on appeal: (1) that the 
District Court procedurally erred by not adequately explaining 
its upward variance, and (2) that the imposition of a four-year 
sentence was substantively unreasonable. 
 
 3 In its briefing before argument, the Government took 
the position that Payano’s argument on this point was waived 
rather than forfeited, and thus was not entitled to plain error 
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we must decide whether (1) an error occurred, (2) the error is 
“plain,” and (3) it “affect[s] substantial rights.”  United States 
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (alteration in original); Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 52(b).  If those three conditions are met, a court of 
appeals should exercise its discretion to correct the error if it 
would “seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 
(quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)).  
Payano has the burden of demonstrating that the four Olano 
factors are met.  Id. at 734-35.   
 
 Here, the first two are clearly satisfied.  There is no 
dispute that the District Court erred in finding that Payano 
pleaded guilty to illegal reentry following an “aggravated 
felony,” in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2), and that 
                                                          
review.  Where a party “invite[s] the District Court[’s]” error 
and the Court proceeds in reliance on that agreement, we have 
navigated the murky waters of forfeiture versus waiver in view 
of the context and extent of the affirmative representation.  
Robinson v. First State Comm. Action Agency, 920 F.3d 182, 
187-89 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding appellee waived rather than 
forfeited its argument where it “[n]ot only . . . fail[ed] to object, 
[but also] specifically assented to” the error); cf. Gov’t of the 
V.I. v. Rosa, 399 F.3d 283, 292-93 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding 
“repeated acquiescence” to an erroneous jury instruction did 
not rise to the level of a knowing and intentional waiver).  We 
need not undertake that analysis here, however, in view of the 
Government’s concession at oral argument that plain error 
review does apply. 
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the error was “plain.”4  The question presented by this case 
arises at Olano’s third prong: whether the District Court’s error 
“affect[ed] [Payano’s] substantial rights.”  507 U.S. at 732.  
Below, we address that issue, and because we conclude his 
substantial rights were affected, we then consider whether, 
under Olano’s fourth prong, the error, if uncorrected, would 
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings. 
 
A. Whether the Error Affected Payano’s Substantial 
 Rights 
 
 For an error to affect a defendant’s substantial rights, it 
must have “prejudiced [him], either specifically or 
presumptively,” i.e., “[i]t must have affected the outcome of 
the district court proceedings.”  Id. at 734, 739.  Demonstrating 
“a prejudicial effect on the outcome of a judicial proceeding” 
ordinarily requires a “reasonable probability” that, but for the 
claimed error, “the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 
81-82 (2004) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 
682 (1985)).  But “reasonable probability” in this context “is 
not the same as, and should not be confused with, a 
                                                          
 4 While Payano’s conviction under New York Penal 
Code § 220.21 constitutes a state felony, “[m]ere possession is 
not . . . a felony under the federal [Controlled Substance Act] 
CSA,” Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 53 (2006) (citing 21 
U.S.C. § 844(a)), and because the categorical approach 
requires it to be a drug trafficking crime under the CSA to 
qualify as an “aggravated felony,” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43); 
1326(b)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), Payano’s 1998 conviction 
does not categorically constitute an “aggravated felony.”  
 8 
 
requirement that a defendant prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that but for [the] error things would have been 
different.”  Id. at 83 n.9.  Rather, as with the prejudice standard 
articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 
(1984), and the materiality standard under Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 
150, 154 (1972), it means only that a defendant must “satisfy 
the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the entire 
record, that the probability of a different result is ‘sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome’ of the proceeding,”  
Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 694; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682); accord United States v. 
Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 929-30 (3d Cir. 2008) (same).5   
 
 Here, then, Payano must show that but for the District 
Court’s erroneous understanding of the applicable statutory 
maximum, the likelihood of a sentence shorter than four years 
                                                          
 5 It may be, as Justice Souter has observed, that the “use 
of the term ‘probability’ raises an unjustifiable risk of 
misleading courts into treating it as akin to the more 
demanding standard, ‘more likely than not,’” and that 
“‘significant possibility’ would do better at capturing the 
degree to which the [error] would place the actual result in 
question, sufficient to warrant overturning a conviction or 
sentence.”  Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 298 (1999) 
(Souter, J., dissenting).  For now, however, the Court and the 
Courts of Appeals continue to use the term, clarifying that 
“reasonable probability” does not mean more likely than not.  
Id.; accord United States v. Vargem, 747 F.3d 724, 728 (9th 
Cir. 2014); United States v. Groysman, 766 F.3d 147, 157 (2d 
Cir. 2014); United States v. Carrasco, 540 F.3d 43, 53 (1st Cir. 
2008). 
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is “sufficient to undermine [our] confidence” in the sentencing 
proceeding.  Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83.  Payano 
argues that he satisfies that standard, either because (1) the 
District Court’s error is one that warrants a presumption of 
prejudice, or, alternatively, (2) the sentencing record reveals a 
“reasonable probability” that the error influenced the District 
Court.  We address these arguments in turn. 
 
1. The statutory-range error here does not 
 give rise to a presumption of prejudice. 
  
 In Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 
(2016), the Supreme Court held that miscalculation of the 
applicable range under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines “itself can, and most often will, be sufficient to 
show a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the 
error.”  Id. at 1345.  Payano asks this Court to extend that 
rebuttable presumption of prejudice for Guidelines-range 
errors to the statutory-range error here—specifically, to a 
district court’s mistaken belief as to the applicable statutory 
maximum.  As the reasoning of Molina-Martinez highlights, 
however, marked differences between the relative significance 
in sentencing of the applicable Guidelines range and the 
statutory range counsel against such an extension.  The Court 
there explained that a presumption of prejudice “must follow” 
from an error related to the Guidelines range because that error 
is “particularly serious” considering (a) “the centrality of the 
Guidelines in the sentencing process,” and (b) the reality that 
the Guidelines range has a “real and pervasive effect” upon the 
ultimate sentence imposed.  Id. at 1345-46; see also id. at 1341 
(noting that most Courts of Appeals “have concluded that a 
district court’s application of an incorrect Guidelines range can 
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itself serve as evidence of an effect on substantial rights”).  But 
neither consideration pertains to the statutory range. 
 
 Unlike the Guidelines, which district courts are required 
to use as the “starting point” for sentencing, to “remain 
cognizant of . . . throughout the sentencing process,” and to 
“explain the decision to deviate from,” statutory ranges merely 
set the floor and the ceiling within which a district court must 
sentence, thereby functioning not to “anchor” the district 
court’s discretion, but rather to limit the extent to which a 
district court may permissibly stray from the Guidelines range.  
Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1345, 1349 (quoting Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007); Peugh v. United States, 
569 U.S. 530, 537, 541 (2013)).6   
 
 As a result, it is no surprise that a Guidelines range and 
a statutory range do not have commensurate effects on the final 
sentence imposed.  Whereas “[i]n most cases district courts . . 
. impose ‘either within-Guidelines sentences or sentences that 
depart downward from the Guidelines on the Government’s 
motion,’” id. at 1346 (quoting Peugh, 569 U.S. at 543) (citing 
U.S.S.C., 2014 Annual Report and 2014 Sourcebook of 
Federal Sentencing Statistics S–50 (19th ed.) (Table N)), 
statutory ranges are generally too expansive to exert significant 
                                                          
 6 Indeed, a Guidelines range—if calculated correctly—
will take account of the requirement that a Guidelines range 
cannot be “greater than the statutorily authorized maximum 
sentence.”  U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(c)(1); see United States v. 
Rivera-Cruz, 904 F.3d 324, 327-28 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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influence over the ultimate sentence imposed.7  And because a 
mistaken belief as to the applicable statutory range is far less 
likely than a Guidelines-range error to affect a sentence, 
Payano is hard-pressed to argue that a statutory-range error is 
alone “sufficient to show a reasonable probability of a different 
outcome.”  Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1345.8    
                                                          
 7 For example, statutory ranges often cover decades and 
are identical across vast swaths of federal crimes.  See, e.g., 18 
U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud; 0-20 years); 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) 
(bank robbery; 0-20 years); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) 
(providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization; 
0-20 years).  In addition, because defendants are often charged 
with multiple offenses for the same course of conduct, any of 
which district courts have discretion to impose either 
concurrently or consecutively, see 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a); Setser 
v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 236 (2012), an aggregated 
statutory range could easily exceed a natural life span.   
 
 8 To be clear, these differences are a product of the way 
our modern sentencing system has evolved.  Before the 
Guidelines, we had a “system of indeterminate sentencing,” 
whereby district judges’ discretion to determine the length of a 
defendant’s period of incarceration was constrained only by 
the applicable statutory range, which often spanned decades.  
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).  The 
“significant sentencing disparities among similarly situated 
offenders” that resulted from indeterminate sentencing led to 
the advent of the United States Sentencing Commission and its 
promulgation of the Sentencing Guidelines.  Peugh v. United 
States, 569 U.S. 530, 535 (2013).  Initially understood to bind 
district courts to impose a sentence within the applicable 
Guidelines range, the Guidelines were intended to achieve both 
“uniformity” and “proportionality in sentencing through a 
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 Indeed, no Court of Appeals to date has accepted that 
argument.  While we are the first to consider the significance 
of Molina-Martinez for an unpreserved error concerning the 
statutory range, we find persuasive the decisions of those 
courts that predated Molina-Martinez but addressed this issue 
against the backdrop of their own Circuit’s presumption of 
prejudice for Guidelines-range errors.  See United States v. 
Goodwin, 717 F.3d 511, 520-21 (7th Cir. 2013); United States 
v. Story, 503 F.3d 436, 441 (6th Cir. 2007); see also United 
States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2001).  For 
instance, the Sixth Circuit found no “persuasive analogy” 
between a Guidelines-range and statutory- range error, 
explaining that while the Guidelines “guide the district court 
toward an appropriate sentence,” statutory ranges merely 
“delineate[] the outer bounds of the district court’s discretion 
in imposing a penalty.”  United States v. McCloud, 730 F.3d 
600, 603 (6th Cir. 2013).  And because an incorrect statutory 
range is not likely to “seriously affect the sentence a defendant 
receive[s],” remanding for resentencing “would be a useless 
exercise” absent some evidence of prejudice in the record.  Id. 
 
                                                          
system that imposes appropriately different sentences for 
criminal conduct of different severity.”  Molina-Martinez, 136 
S. Ct. at 1342 (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 349 
(2007) (emphasis omitted)).  While the Guidelines, of course, 
are no longer mandatory, see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220, 244 (2005), their “centrality” to both the sentencing 
procedures that district courts employ and the ultimate 
sentences they impose continue to facilitate the uniformity and 
proportionality that statutory ranges alone were unable to 
achieve, Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1345; see Peugh, 569 
U.S. at 536-37.  
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   The Seventh Circuit likewise declined to extend a 
presumption of prejudice where the district court’s sentence 
gave rise to “competing inferences” as to “what the sentencing 
judge might have done had she known that she was not bound 
by the ten-year minimum.”  United States v. Currie, 739 F.3d 
960, 965 (7th Cir. 2014).  Instead, it “order[ed] a limited 
remand” to determine whether there was actual prejudice, i.e., 
whether the district court would have imposed the same 
sentence absent the error.9  Id. at 967; cf. United States v. 
Williams, 742 F.3d 304, 306-07 (7th Cir. 2014) (presuming 
prejudice and declining to issue a limited remand, in favor of a 
full remand, in the context of a Guidelines range error).10   
                                                          
 9 The statutory-range errors in McCloud and Currie 
differed from that present here in that they both involved a 
mistaken belief as to the applicable statutory minimum.  In 
those cases, the district court had failed to retroactively apply 
the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA), as required by the Supreme 
Court in Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 280-81 (2012), 
which in each case would have lowered the applicable statutory 
minimum by five years.  See McCloud, 730 F.3d at 601-02 
(FSA lowered applicable statutory range from 5-40 years to 0-
20 years); Currie, 739 F.3d at 964 (FSA lowered mandatory 
minimum from 10 years to 5 years).  Notably, those courts 
declined to recognize a presumption of prejudice even though 
an error as to the existence or length of a mandatory minimum 
sentence is arguably far more prejudicial than an error as to an 
applicable statutory maximum that is not reached by the 
sentence imposed. 
 
 10 Additionally, while the D.C. Circuit had not expressly 
recognized a presumption of prejudice in the Guidelines 
context prior to Molina-Martinez, its decision in United States 
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 Payano’s arguments in favor of extending the 
presumption of prejudice also are unavailing.  He first contends 
that an erroneous statutory range is presumptively prejudicial 
at least in the context of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, the illegal reentry 
statute, because it contains a three-tiered sentencing 
“framework” with different statutory maxima keyed to 
criminal history and thus should be viewed, like the 
Guidelines, as “aim[ing] to embody” the sentencing factors 
articulated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553.  Appellant’s Br. 25 (quoting 
Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1342); see Tr. of Oral Arg. 
1:48:00-1:49:30.11  But each tier of that framework still covers 
a wide statutory range that, unlike the “set of elaborate, detailed 
Guidelines” considered in Molina-Martinez, cannot be said to 
narrowly tailor sentences to individual defendants. 136 S. Ct. 
at 1342.  Second, he argues that requiring evidence of prejudice 
would be unfair because “sentencing courts are customarily 
silent” when they impose a sentence within the statutory range, 
                                                          
v. Watson, 476 F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2007), also accords with 
our analysis.  There, the district court mistakenly believed that 
the applicable statutory maximum was twenty as opposed to 
ten years, and the appellate court found plain error not by 
presuming prejudice but because statements in the record 
revealed that the district court was operating “under the 
misimpression [that] it was imposing a relatively lenient 
sentence” which “infected” the proceedings.  Id. at 1021, 1024.    
 
 11 8 U.S.C. § 1326’s three-tiered framework includes a 
2-year statutory maximum for illegal reentry by a non-
recidivist, id. § 1326(a)(2), a 10-year statutory maximum for 
illegal reentry after a felony conviction, id. § 1326(b)(1), and a 
20-year statutory maximum for illegal reentry after an 
aggravated felony conviction, id. § 1326(b)(2).  
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Appellant’s Br. 28, just as they are when a sentence falls within 
the Guidelines range.  But again, the Guidelines range imposes 
a far more significant constraint because a sentencing court 
must explain any deviation from them.  Finally, Payano asserts 
that an erroneous statutory maximum, like a Guidelines 
miscalculation, gives rise to a procedural error because it 
precludes a sentencing court from considering “the kinds of 
sentences available,” as required under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3).  
But that argument rests on a mistaken premise because not all 
procedural errors are presumptively prejudicial.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Stevens, 223 F.3d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(declining to extend presumption of prejudice to violation of 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, which requires courts 
to “verify that the defendant has read and discussed the PSR 
with counsel”).  
 
 In sum, unlike an erroneous Guidelines range, an 
erroneous statutory range is not “itself . . . sufficient to show a 
reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the error.”  
Molina-Martinez, 136 S Ct. at 1345.  And without a 
presumption, a defendant must show actual prejudice to satisfy 
the third prong of the Olano test.  Thus, we turn to the next 
question before us: whether, on this sentencing record, the 
possibility of a lesser sentence absent the statutory-range error 
is “‘sufficient to undermine [our] confidence in the outcome’ 
of [his] proceeding.”  Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83 
(citation omitted).   
 
2. Payano has established actual prejudice. 
 
 In the absence of a presumption of prejudice, a 
reviewing court’s determination as to whether a defendant has 
established actual prejudice on plain-error review, i.e., a 
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“reasonable probability” of a lower sentence, must be 
“informed by the entire record.”  Id. at 83; see Molina-
Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1351 (Alito, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (“[T]here is no good reason to 
preclude defendants from showing prejudice via . . . 
circumstantial evidence” such as the parties’ “sentencing 
arguments.”).  On this record—where the District Court 
sentenced Payano significantly above the top of the applicable 
Guidelines range, was repeatedly urged by the Government to 
vary upwards on account of a supposed prior “drug trafficking 
conviction,” and itself directed the PSR be amended to reflect 
a twenty-year statutory maximum—we cannot be confident 
that the four-year sentence the District Court imposed was not 
affected by its mistaken belief that it was sentencing Payano 
for “aggravated reentry.” 
 
 Prominent in the record are the Government’s 
arguments in support of its request for an upward variance from 
the applicable Guidelines range.  From the very first page of its 
sentencing memorandum, the Government pressed the point 
that Payano was “originally removed . . . following a drug 
trafficking conviction in New York.”  JA 67-68.  It then 
repeatedly reinforced that erroneous assertion, arguing, for 
example, that a variance was warranted to “take[] into account 
[Payano’s] unlawful return to the United States to engage in 
serious drug trafficking activities”; that he was engaged in “the 
very same behavior” that got him deported in the first place, 
JA 71; that Payano came back to the United States “to engage 
in the same drug business that caused his deportation,” JA 75; 
and that the ten-year statutory maximum in the PSR was 
“incorrect[] . . . [b]ecause [Payano] was convicted of an 
 17 
 
aggravated felony prior to his deportation,” JA 69 n.2.12  The 
Government also emphasized how “serious” the prior 
conviction was, by noting both that “Payano was sentenced to 
3 years to lifetime imprisonment with lifetime parole,” JA 70-
71, and that “the defendant’s criminal history and current 
conduct demonstrate[d] a willingness to commit serious crimes 
and defy court orders,” JA 71.   
 
 The mistaken assertion that Payano’s original 
conviction was for drug trafficking also permeated the 
sentencing hearing, where the Government urged the District 
Court at the outset to “correct” the PSR to confirm that Payano 
had pleaded guilty to “aggravated reentry,” JA 92-93, and 
argued that the upward variance was warranted because 
Payano “came back to the United States to engage in the very 
same conduct that he was found on April 3, 2017 to be engaged 
in, trafficking in drugs,” JA 127.  At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the District Court granted that variance, explaining 
that it was warranted in light of the fact that illegal reentry is a 
“serious crime” made all the “more serious” given “the very 
nature of this situation”—“[t]he reentry after deportation and 
the drugs that were involved in this situation.”  JA 129-30.  
 
 The Government contends that because the District 
Court only referenced the statutory maximum once at the 
sentencing hearing—and even then “only to accept the parties’ 
                                                          
 12 Other examples abound.  E.g., JA 73 (“Because it was 
an aggravated felony, [Payano] was deported from the United 
States in January 2001.”); JA 73 (arguing that Payano “knew 
the consequences of his behavior because he had done it and 
been caught before”); JA 75 (“[Payano] became an aggravated 
felon and was deported.”). 
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representation that the PSR incorrectly stated that the statutory 
maximum was 10 rather than 20 years”—the error with regard 
to “[t]he statutory maximum penalty played no role in the 
court’s analysis or reasoning.”  Gov’t Br. 22-23.  Rather, it 
contends, as the District Court “repeatedly noted” at the 
sentencing hearing, its decision to vary upwards and impose an 
above-Guidelines “sentence was driven by the defendant’s 
[uncharged] drug trafficking activity after he returned to the 
United States.”  Gov’t Br. 28. 
 
  To be sure, there were permissible bases upon which 
the District Court may have exercised its discretion to impose 
an above-Guidelines sentence.  See United States v. Berry, 553 
F.3d 273, 279-80 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding sentencing courts are 
entitled to rely on facts so long as they are “proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence”).  It was entitled to consider, 
for example, the “conduct underlying [his] dismissed [drug 
distribution] count,” United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 863 
(3d Cir. 1997), which, but for the Government’s decision to 
dismiss it after Payano’s successful suppression motion, could 
have subjected Payano to a five-year mandatory minimum 
sentence—a year longer than the sentence the District Court 
imposed, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii).13  So too would it 
be permissible for the District Court to vary upwards based on 
the fact that Payano’s uncharged drug trafficking conduct 
mirrored the conduct underlying his prior conviction, 
including, as stated in the PSR, that the police previously had 
                                                          
 13 In making those factual findings, the District Court 
relied on the testimony of Drug Enforcement Agency Special 
Agent Lisa Amoroso and Philadelphia Police Officer Luis 
Melendez regarding Payano’s post-arrest statements admitting 
that the kilogram of cocaine found in the vehicle was his. 
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also seized more than a kilogram of cocaine, as well as a loaded 
firearm, from a “trap in the driver’s side door of his vehicle,” 
Gov’t Br. 6 (citing PSR ¶ 27)—a fact to which Payano did not 
object.  See United States v. Pollard, 986 F.2d 44, 46-47 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (“[A] sentencing court possesses great discretion in 
the conduct it may consider . . . even if the conduct was not 
proven at trial, but came from a presentence report.”) (citations 
omitted).   
 
 These permissible considerations alone may have 
accounted for the District Court’s upward variance and, to the 
extent they did, the District Court on remand may well opt to 
re-impose the same exact sentence.  But against the backdrop 
of the “entire record,” there is at least a “reasonable 
probability” that the four-year sentence was based on the 
District Court’s mistaken belief as to the applicable statutory 
maximum.  Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83.  And given the 
pervasiveness of the Government’s sentencing arguments that 
Payano had been convicted of “drug trafficking,” had pleaded 
guilty to an “aggravated felony,” and was subject to a 
“maximum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment,” JA 69, 71, 
73, 75, 78, 92-93, we cannot be confident on this record that 
the District Court did not conflate the underlying drug 
trafficking conduct common to both Payano’s prior and instant 
convictions with the belief that his prior conviction had been 
for drug trafficking, which triggered a potential sentence twice 
as long and thus may have informed the extent of the upward 
variance.  Because “we cannot say with complete confidence 
that the court would have imposed the same sentence 
regardless of the [erroneous statutory maximum],” Currie, 739 
F.3d at 966, we must conclude that the error “affect[ed] 
[Payano’s] substantial rights,” Olano, 507 U.S. at 732; cf. 
United States v. Watson, 476 F.3d 1020, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
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(court had “no trouble seeing” the effect of the erroneous 
statutory maximum upon substantial rights where district court 
stated its sentence was “considerably less than the statutorily-
available sentencing maximum”).   
 
B. Whether the District Court’s Error Would 
 Seriously Affect the Fairness, Integrity, or Public 
 Reputation of Judicial Proceedings  
 
 Even though Olano’s first three conditions are met, this 
Court will only exercise its discretion to correct a forfeited 
error if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”  507 U.S. at 736 (alteration 
omitted).  Here, the Government has conceded that, should the 
Court find Payano’s substantial rights affected, this standard 
would be met and we should remand for resentencing.  That is 
an appropriate concession given that, upon a showing of 
prejudice from a statutory-range error, a defendant is in a 
procedural posture functionally equivalent to that of a 
defendant with a Guidelines-range error, where prejudice is 
presumed, and in the latter context, the Supreme Court has 
observed:  “[A] reasonable citizen [would] bear a rightly 
diminished view of the judicial process and its integrity if 
courts refused to correct obvious errors of their own devise that 
threaten to require individuals to linger longer in federal prison 
than the law demands.”  Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 
S. Ct. 1897, 1908 (2018) (quoting United States v. Sabillon–
Umana, 772 F.3d 1328, 1333-34 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, 
J.)).  The Court also explained that while “Rule 52(b) should 
be exercised ‘sparingly’” for trial errors, id. at 1909 (quoting 
Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 389 (1999)), correcting 
sentencing errors “is far less burdensome than a retrial, or other 
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jury proceedings, and thus does not demand such a high degree 
of caution.”  Id.   
 
 These considerations favor remand here, where we are 
unable to discern on this record whether the District Court 
granted the upward variance based on permissible 
considerations or on the Government’s unfounded argument 
that Payano’s previous offense was an aggravated felony—or 
on both.  Thus, we agree that Payano has also met his burden 
of showing that the statutory-range error here, if not corrected, 
would “seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Olano, 507 U.S. at 732.   
  
III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s sentence and remand for resentencing. 
